application, have gradually extended it. Two of its harshest early critics, Lords Eldon and Hardwicke 2 were responsible for arguably its greatest enlargement.
Of the 3 primary requirements the first two have their precedent in Roman law. The third requirement is the invention of the English courts: it is at once the fundamental, distinguishing characteristic of the modern form of the doctrine (without it there is just an oral will); and also its most problematic aspect.
It will be seen from the foregoing that 'deathbed gifts' (the title of the only modern textbook published on the subject 3 ) is something of a misnomer. There is no requirement that the donor should be on his or her 'deathbed' and although it is a gift it is one of a most unique, hybrid or 'amphibious' 4 kind, with a present intention to give but only taking effect after death: partly like an inter-vivos gift and like a testamentary gift, but ultimately sitting somewhere between the two.
The DMC relies for its operation upon the imposition of a constructive trust arising upon death to avoid the need for writing (s.53(2) LPA 1925).
Development of the 3 main principles over time
It is fair to observe that the three principal requirements have been interpreted generously by the courts:
The first requirement: contemplation of death A gift made in contemplation of impending death does not require the donor to be in expectation of death or 'in extremis', although it has been said that this means death not just at some time or other but needs to be "within the near future" Re Craven's Estate (No.1) [1937] Ch. 423.
The tenor of the decided cases is also that whether impending death is contemplated is a matter to be judged subjectively. Thus it may apply where a donor has a fear of flying, and believes his plane will crash, however objectively irrational that fear may be. Therefore it is also irrelevant whether or not death occurred from the anticipated cause (e.g. a heart operation) as opposed to an unanticipated cause (e.g. being hit by a bus on the way to the hospital). A DMC might even be made in contemplation of death by suicide 5 .
Notwithstanding that the earliest reported case of a DMC, that of Hedges v Hedges [1708] Prec Ch. 269, referred to the doctrine as being justified in cases "where a man lies in extremity, or being surprized with sickness, and not having an opportunity to make his will" (per Lord Cowper) this lack of opportunity to make a will has never been adopted as a requirement of the application of the doctrine in subsequent authority.
The second requirement: conditional upon death
The courts have been willing to infer the conditionality of the gift, which might otherwise appear to be expressed in absolute and immediate terms, from the circumstances of the case. "The house is yours, Margaret." Sen v Headley [1991] Ch 425 "There, take that, and keep it." Gardner v Parker (1818) 3 Madd. 184. "You can keep the keys, I won't be driving it any more." Woodard v Woodard [1995] 3 All ER 980, a case about a car 6 . The third requirement: dominion, and the significance of 'indicia' of title Legal transfer will suffice, but is not necessary. The courts have accepted both actual physical delivery (e.g. placing a cash box into the hands of the donee) and constructive delivery (giving the key to box, or to the cupboard in which it is kept). Perhaps most problematic of all, in cases where the subject-matter of the gift is not capable of delivery (because it is intangible, like a chose in action) the doctrine has been extended to allow dominion to pass by delivery of the 'indicia of title' thereto. The leading modern authority on 'indicia' is Birch v Treasury Solicitor [1951] Ch 298, a case which concerned the handing over of various Post Office and Bank deposit books. A DMC of the monies in those accounts was found. In the Court of Appeal Evershed MR reiterated that symbolic delivery of mere tokens was not enough, there must be transfer of the subject matter of the gift or of 'something amounting to that' (citing Ward v Turner (1751) 2 Ves. Sen. 431). He went on to define the 'indicia' in this way:
"… the indicia of title, as distinct from mere evidence of title, the document or thing the possession or production of which entitles the possessor to the money or property purported to be given." This definition of 'indicia' might be refined further, as the document or thing which 'normally' must be produced (the evidence in Birch was that bank employees might in practice occasionally waive the requirement to produce the deposit books, which did not contain the full terms of the contract between bank and customer in any event). The concepts of 'dominion' and 'indicia' continue to present considerable challenges to the practitioner, not least in the recent case of Vallée v Birchwood, as will be seen below.
Extension of the DMC to land
Until 1990 it was universally assumed that a DMC could never apply to land, although the only authority for the proposition was Lord Eldon's comments in Duffield v Elwes (1827) 1 Bligh (NS) 497 (a case concerning a mortgage, and therefore strictly obiter with regard to title to land).
The DMC was extended to real property in the landmark Court of Appeal decision in Sen v Headley [1991] Ch 425, undoubtedly the most significant DMC case in the last 50 years, and arguably since the earliest authorities of the 18 th century.
6 a curious dispute between mother and son concerning the deceased father's Austin Metro motorcar, coming on for appeal over 2 years after trial since when the car had long since been sold and the money spent. Both sides were legally aided and the son had no prospect of paying the money even if the mother won. "It is now about the most sterile appeal I have ever come across." Dillon LJ. Words held to be of gift -just about -and moreover a DMC because the son accepted that if father had recovered he would have reclaimed the vehicle.
The case concerned a gift by a Mr Hewett to his long-time companion Mrs Sen. Three days before his death Mr Hewett told Mrs Sen "The house is yours, Margaret". Unknown to her he had slipped keys to a steel box (containing the title deeds to his home, which was unregistered land) into her bag. She already had the keys to the house, and day-to-day control of it, because she was looking after it during Mr Hewett's absence in hospital. At first instance Mummery J expressed the view that he could not see a DMC ever applying to land. He reasoned thus: Mr Hewett had retained the entire legal and equitable interest in the house and therefore could declare a trust of it or purport to sell it by contract. He had not parted with dominion. On appeal to the Court of Appeal Nourse LJ disagreed. The title deeds were the 'indicia' of title, and had been constructively passed to Mrs Sen. Mummery J's objections could also be made of choses in action, where the possibilities of DMCs had long since been established. If gifts could be made of other property, then why not land? As Nourse LJ put it, the DMC was indeed an anomaly but:
"anomalies do not justify anomalous exceptions." [p.440 at B].
The case was closely analysed in Vallée v Birchwood, and will be discussed further below.
The recent case of Vallée v Birchwood [2013] EWHC 1449
The 
The decision in Vallée
Thorough, written judgment of Jonathan Gaunt QC, sitting as a deputy judge of the Chancery Division.
Two main grounds of appeal:
1.
Appellant contended not impending death if survived for more than 4 months (a fortiori if the original mischief the doctrine was devised to address was inability to make a formal will in extremis)
2.
Appellant contended that dominion had not passed because donor continued to occupy and control the subject matter of the gift.
Addressing each in turn:
Impending death in Vallée
Review of the cases cited before the court, the interval between gift and death was usually only a few days. Context: death before next visit of daughter at Christmas = near future. To which might be added: Mr Bogusz's prediction of demise was, after all, very accurate.
Lack of opportunity to make a will is not a requirement.
Additional reasoning of the Deputy Judge: "I do not consider that Equity intervenes in such cases only out of sympathy for those caught out in extremis but rather to give effect to the intentions of donors sufficiently evidenced by their acts such that the conscience of the donor's personal representative is affected." [ § 27]
Difficulties with this additional reasoning: A new test of unconscionability? Akin to an estoppel? Taking the role of the constructive trust too far? If so, why would the same reasoning not apply to the maker of a nuncupative will, or a will invalid for inadvertent want of some compliance with formality? There too, the personal representative will know that he/she is administering an estate against the testator's wishes. Ultimately, the point made by the Deputy Judge, which lacks authority, was unnecessary to the decision. It is suggested this additional reasoning should be treated with caution.
Dominion in Vallée
Passing "dominion" a very difficult concept: long established in authority as a requirement but not defined. Something more than mere possession, something less than ownership. Nourse LJ did accept a distinction between dominion "over the deeds" and dominion "over the house". Seemed to indicate some physical control of bricks and mortar. Nourse LJ considered whether there might be a case where indicia were handed over, but dominion did not pass.
" Lessons from Vallée and the future of the DMC Causes for alarm for those who do not favour the DMC, and prefer certainty in the administration of estates?
long interval between gift and death -gift was effectively the entire value of the estate -lack of physical control of the subject property by the donee -dominion less easy to define than ever -the risk of abuse: consider the difficulty, especially for (say) charity legatees, to gainsay evidence of alleged donee. Note that a donee can succeed on own evidence alone, uncorroborated. Although the court will subject such evidence to considerable scrutiny 7 (arguably even more so where donee is person best placed to obtain deeds after death), that may be of little practical assistance where the burden of proof remains on the balance of probabilities.
However, whilst deathbed gifts seem in rude health following Vallée it could prove to be the high water mark.
a. the risk of abuse may be overstated. The DMC has not really entered into public consciousness (contrast it to, say, 'squatters' rights' of adverse possession).
b.
Difficult to conceive of many circumstances in which over 4 months is likely to be "impending" -the facts of Vallée were, after all, very unusual c.
Possibly But no doubt the greatest limitation on the future of the DMC is the everdwindling number of assets to which, in practice, it would seem to apply. There must be 'indicia of title' for the land / choses in action in question. Something you would 'normally' require to prove ownership. Probably means limited to Unregistered Land. Registered Land -no Land Certificate since LRA 2002. Consider also uncertificated shares. Or deposit accounts without 'passbooks', accessed by password. Would giving a password be enough? Perhaps one 'shares' rather than 'gives' a password? If one draws up a list of choses in action with 'indicia', it produces anomalous results: e.g. only deposit and current accounts operated by a deposit book And there are other anomalies too: e.g. Chq drawn by third party yes, because it is a chose in action, but a chq drawn on the donor's own account not a chose in action just a mandate to the bank (lapses on death). What is left in practice? Assets with 'indicia' (in addition to unregistered land). The list is rather arbitrary 9 . Mostly the assets identified that have 'indicia' are 'old fashioned', e.g. premium bonds, building society passbook accounts, a handful of others. But potentially they are those most likely to be owned by a person most likely to attempt a DMC? Consider the problem of handing over a 'mixed bag' of documents. Would the court really find that some were capable of forming a DMC but not others where the donor's intention towards them was the same?
The justification for the DMC?
It is suggested that the future of the DMC depends upon its justification. What is it for and do we want it? (the million dollar question studiously avoided in the authorities).
The case for:
 It fulfils a human need for the donor. People seem naturally to believe it should work. No evidence of donors invoking the DMC because they know of the doctrine. Uncontrived and instinctive.  The law should follow such moral impulses, and honour a person's last wishes wherever possible, rather than setting itself in opposition to that sense of natural justice  Creates an expectation for the donee: proprietary estoppel of 1975 Act claims cannot assist in all cases  It is generally desirable that estates should pass to those who the deceased truly intended to benefit  It has stood the test of time
